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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
No. 216937
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Director Assistance Payment
Administration, Utah State
Department of Social Services,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
LESTER ROMERO, aka
RALPH G. ROMERO,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT - APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Action by Plaintiff to recover assistance payments,
which were allegedly extended to Defendant because of misrepresentation to the Department of Social Services.
DISPOSITION IN

LOw~R

COURT

The trial court heard the matter on the merits and
granted judgment to the Plaintiff
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order vacating the judgment
in the lower court, and reversing and remanding the matter
to the lower court with instructions to dismiss the case.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Appellant received public assistance from the
State of Utah in an amount of Eleven Thousand Nine Hundred
Eight-one and 21/100 dollars ($11,981.21) from the Respondent
during the period of February, 1969 through November, 1973
intermittently.
The Respondent filed a complaint to recover the
assistance payments from the Appellant for misrepresentation
in the applications for the assistance on January 11, 1974.
At the time of the filing of the complaint, the
Appellant retained an attorney to represent him, and the same
filed a set of interrogatories, a set of requests for admis-

sion and a request for the production of documents, on April 5
1974.
The Respondent file its answers to interrogatories
and answers to requests for admission on July 18, 1978, some
four years and three and a half months latter.
The Respondent filed his request for trial setting
on the 15th of September, 1978, and the attorney for the
Appel1ant
1978.

withdrew from the case on the 25th day of September

Thereafter the Appellant

went unrepresented to and

through the trial on the merits which ended on June 15, 1979.
From judgment in favor of the Respondent the Appellant appeals.
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ARGUMENT ONE
THE MATTER SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE OF
THE RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO RESPOND TO APPELLANTS REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION.
In the facts of the case, the Appellant served a
set of Requests for Admission on the Respondent, and the latter failed to either admit or deny or otherwise respond to the
same until some four years, three and a half months latter.
Rule 36(a), in relevant part, provides:
Each matter of which an admission is requested
shall be separately set forth. The matter is admitted
unless, within thirty days after service of the request,
or within such shorter or longer time as the court may
allow, the party to whom the request is directed
serves upon the party requesting the admission a
written answer or objection addressed to the matter
signed by the party or by his attorney, but, unless
the court shortens the time a defendant shall not
be required to serve answers or objections before
the expiration of 45 days after service of the
summons and complaint upon him . . .
And Rule 36(b) provides:
Any matter admitted under this Rule is conclusively
established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission .
Well over a 1,000 days had expired prior to the time
that the Respondent responded to the Requests for Admission,
nor have they moved to withdraw or amend their admissions.
Respondent have therefore admitted the matters contained in
the Appellants Requests for Admission, which include:
That Defendant (Appellant) had no (a) income
which was not reported to you, or (b) assets which
were not reported to you or (c) of which you wece
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
not aware
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I

(
assistance payments.

f
I

Also,

I

That Defendant (Appellant) was entitled under applicable law and the determination made by your office'
to receive each assistance payment received by him
during the discovery period.

I

Also,
That Defendant is not indebted to you in any

amount~

I

I

The App_e~lant is not limited to the sanctions of Rule·

37(c) because Rule 37(c) deals only to parties who unjustifi- )

~

ably fail to admit facts, but who nevertheless have responded
to the request.

By failing to respond to the requests, the fac:

are admitted under Rule 36 (a), and the provisions of Rule 37(c) (
do not apply.

Note Schmitt vs. Billings, et al., No. 16084,

r

filed August 24, 1979, not yet printed in the Pacific Reporter'

I

or Utah Reporter.
Hence, "As (Respondents) have admitted all of the

fac:~

noted supra, there remains no litigable issue, and (Appellant) ·I
entitled to judgment against the .

. . (Respondents).

. . " not'(

page 4, of Schmitt vs. Billings, et al. also W. B. Gardner,
vs. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P2d 734, Utah Supreme Court
1977).
ARGUMENT TWO
THE MATTER SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE OF
THE RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO RESPOND TO APPELLANT'S INTERROGATORIES.
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Inc~

In the facts of the case, the Appellant served a
set of Interrogatories on the Respondent, and the latter
failed to respond to the same for over four years.
Rule 33(a) states:
Any party may serve upon any other party written
interrogatories to be answered by the party served
The Party upon whom the interrogatories have
been served shall serve a copy of the 9f answers
and objections if any, within 30 days after service
of the interrogatories
Rule 37(d) states:
If a party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a party or a person designedated under
Rule 30(b)(6) or 3l(a) to testify on behalf of a
party fails . . . (2) to serve answers or objections
to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after
proper service of the interrogatories . . . the
Court in which the action is pending on motion may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are
just, and among others it may take any action authorized under paragraphs (A), (B) and (C) of subdivision
(b)(2) of this Rule.
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides:
An order striking out pleadings, or parts thereof,
or staying further proceedings until the order is
obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or
any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party.
As a result thereof, the party on whom the interrogatories are served has 30 day in which to respond, if they fail
to do so, the Court may strike out the pleadings, dismiss the
action or render a judgment by default against the respondents.
In the Utah Supreme Court case of W. B. Gardner, Inc.,
vs. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P2d 734, 1977, the Court
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l

I

reasoned from the Naive v. Jones case, Ky., 353 S.W.2d 365 (19'1

"·!

that after 10 months the plaintiff had not undertaken to objecti
to the interrogatories, to request additional time, or to explol
or justify his failure to answer, and therefore and for other
reasons sustained the dismissal of the action.
ARGUMENT THREE
THE MATTER SHOULD BE DISMISSED WHERE THE FAILURE TO
RESPOND TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY IMPEDES TRIAL ON THE MERITS

&~

MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ASCERTAIN WHERTHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF
THE COMPLAINT HAVE ANY FACTUAL MERIT.
In the case at hand, the Respondent asserted at triaii
that i f the Appellant had any property five years before filin1
for assistance he must so indicate on the application.

ThereaU

the Respondent took it upon themselves to prove that the AppelU
was not entitled to the assistance in 1969, then filed the com·
plaint in 1974, and then brings the man to trial in 19790
The basis for the trial in 1979 is what occurred in;:
after 1964.

The record is replete with situations and circum·

stances which the Respondent could not remember clearly because
of a head injury since their occurrance and the length of time
since their occurranceo

(Please note pages 315 and 322 of the

transcript as examples.
In the Utah Supreme Court case of VI 0 B 0 Gardner, IE£:.
vs. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P2d 734, 1977, at page 738,
the Court stated the following:
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The extreme sanction of default or dismissal
must be tempered by the careful exercise of judicial
discretion to assure that its imposition is merited.
Under Rule 37(d) sanctions are justified without reference to whether the unexcused failure to make discovery was wilful. The sanction of default judgment
is justified where there has been a frustration of
the judicial process, viz, where the failure to
respond to discovery impedes trial on the merits and
makes impossible to ascertain whether the allegations
of the answer have any factual merit.
In the matter at hand, if the discovery was responded
to on time, the Appellant would have had the benefit of having
less time to pass over to reconstruct what had happened, concernmitantly, the Appellant would have had the benefits of legal
counsel, which he did not have at the time of trial.
Therefore, the delay did infact impede the trial on
the merits and made it impossible for the Appellant to ascertain whether the allegations of the complaint had any factual
merit.
The Court further reasoned in the Gardner, as follows:
A (party) may not ignore with impunity the requirements of Rule 33 . . . A party to an action has a
right to have the benefits of discovery procedure
promptly, not only in order that he may have ample
time to prepare his case, but also in order to bring
to light facts which may entitled him to summary
judgment or induce settlement prior to trial. The
rules were designed to secure the "just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action," Rule 1.
ARGUMENT FOUR
THE

~~TTER

SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE

TO PROSECUTE.
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According to the facts of the case, the complaint
was filed on January 11, 1974, and the trial was concluded
on June 15, 1979, for a total time of almost five and one
half years.
The time, however, between when the answer was filed
and a request for trial was filed was almost four and one
half years to the day.
As a result, but for the failure of the Respondent
to prevent unnecessary delay in the litigation, the total
time of the matter which was five and one half years could
have arguably been reduced to one year.
In 24 AmJur 2d §59 is the following:
As a general rule an action may be dismissed or a
nonsuit granted because of the Plaintiff's failure
to appear and prosecute his case, or for his failure
to prosecute his case diligently. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure specifically provide for dismissal of an action, on motion of the defendant, for
failure of the Plaintiff to prosecute his actions or
claims, and similar provisions are found in the prac·
tice statutes and rules of practice in other jurisdictions. Such a provision for dismissal for want of
prosecution is applicable at the pleading stage of
the case. Its obvious purpose is to prevent unnecessary harassment and delay in litigation.
In a 1975, Utah Supreme Court case, the Court stated
that where after two years the Plaintiff was not ready for tria
had not filed a bond, had made no discovery and had been dila~
in responding to Defendant's discovery, the matter was properl;
dismissed.

Maxfield v. Fishler, 538 P.2d 1323.
Also note, Brasher Motor & Finance Co. v. Brmm, 23
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U. (2d) 389, 461 P.2d 464, and Thompson Ditch co. v. Jackson,

29 U. (2d) 259, 508 P. 2d 528, and Westinghouse Electric Supply
Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P. 2d 876.
ARGUMENT FIVE
AS A MATTER OF LACHES THE MATTER SHOULD HAVE BEEN
DISMISSED.
As a matter of mere equity and fairness, the matter
should have been dismissed.

Under the facts, a reasonable

man could have assumed that the State had abandoned it suit,
and as a result, concornrnitantly he relaxed his diligence to
defend.
In 24 AmJur 2d §59, at page 50 is the following:
The question of laches depends on whether, under
the facts and circumstances of the particular case
the Plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.
In the facts at hand, if the Plaintiff had with due
diligence pursued the matter, the Defendant would have been
represented by counsel.

The Defendant would have had less

time overwhich to pass, in order to reconstruct an account of
what had taken place;

he would have been able to better re-

collect any statements or representations, which were the basis
of the judgment and could clearly have been better prepared
to put on a defense.

(According to the transcript the Respondent

did not even have the benefit of his file when he represented
himself, which vJas due to the extensive inactivity in the case)
Therefore as a matter of laches, the matter should
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have·been dismissed.

Please note Manson v. First National Bank,
_q_

366 Pa 211, 77 A2d 399, also Hollenback v. California Western
R. R., C.A. 9th, 1972, 465 F.2d 122, also, Sellick v. Helson,
C.A. 9th, 1972, 459 F. 2d 670, also, Maxey v. Citizens

Natio~

Bank of Lubbock, Texas, C.A. 5th, 1972, 459 F.2d 56.

CONCLUSION
In the facts of this case, we have an individual
who was at one time represented by Counsel.

At the time of

the representation by Counsel, the individual did nothing :_to de:f
the matter, in fact filed timely each of the documents required I
of him.
The Plaintiff in the matter merely filed a complaint, and did nothing further to forward the matter until sari
four and one half years later, and then he filed documents whic'
were over four years late.
The Defendant in the meantime, was no longer represented by Counsel, furthermore he could reasonably assume
that the Plaintiff had abandoned the case.
At the time of trial the Defendant went unassistE
and infact could have surrrrnarily handled the matter if he hadar,
attorney.

Furthermore, over the vast time period the file was

apparently lost, and so the Defendant while unassisted, proceei
with the trial without so much as the file on the matter.
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The Court could and should have dismissed the
matter for any one of several reasons including:

(1) Failure

to respond to the Request for Admissions, timely; (2) Failure
to respond to the Interrogatories, timely; (3)

Delay in the

responding to the discovery, which concornrnitantly delayed the
trial;

(4)

Failure to Prosecute, and (5) Laches.
The Court could have acted on its own motion

to do any of the above-named remedies, but did not, and perhaps it did not because it was not fully informed of the procedural errors in the matter.

Yet the Court should have been

so informed, and perhaps would have if the Defendant had an
Attorney at the time of trial, and he did have at one time,
but due to the great time in the delay he did not at the time
when it carne on for trial.
For failure to respond to the Requests for Admissions, the matter submitted in the same are deemed admitted
and so at the time of the trial there were no litigable issues
because the Plaintiff had not moved for additional time or for
permission to amend or alter the admissions.
Without doing so, the matter was essentially res
judicata, and should have never gone to trial, and for the same
reason the judgment ought to be set aside, and the matter dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of December,

//

1979.

JOHN WALSH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered
three copies of the Brief of Appellant, to the Respondent, by

delivering the same to Stephen G. Schwendiman, Assistant Attorney
General, 140 West North Temple, Suite 234, Salt Lake City, Utah
84103, this

0'~Y

of December, 1979.
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